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“Come senators, congressmen 
Please heed the call 
Don’t stand in the doorway 
Don’t block up the hall 
For he that gets hurt 
Will be he who has stalled 
There’s a battle outside and it is ragin’ 
It’ll soon shake your windows and rattle your walls 
For the times they are a-changin’”1 
 
“We are in a new era in which diagnosis has such social and political 
implications that one is constantly on the front lines fighting on issues 
our forebears were spared.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, courts and legislatures have been reluctant to estab-
lish legal protections for transgender and transsexual people in the 
United States.3  This may be due, in part, to the slow pace at which 
American society itself has come to accept this very misunderstood 
psychological and biological phenomenon.  Fortunately, as scientific 
research and social acceptance mature, this minority is beginning to 
enjoy greater rights and recognition. 
In recent years, the transgender community has enjoyed signifi-
cant changes in law and society.  In February 2010, the U.S. Tax 
Court in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner ruled that sex-transitioning 
treatments were tax deductible.4  The following November, the first 
openly transsexual judge in the nation was elected to the California 
  
 1 BOB DYLAN, THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 2005) 
(1964). 
 2 Jack Drescher, Queer Diagnoses: Parallels and Contrasts in the History of 
Homosexuality, Gender Variance, and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 39 
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 427, 428 (2010) (quoting RONALD BAYER, 
HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 10 
(1981)). 
 3 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
 4 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 77 (2010). 
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bench.5  Anti-discrimination legislation protecting jobs and housing is 
becoming increasingly popular, and the Affordable Care Act removed 
some barriers to better health care.6 
These changes demonstrate greater legal recognition and social 
acceptance of transgender people in the United States.  More impor-
tantly, these are changes that promote the interests of all transsexual 
citizens, not just the few who cry out and demand justice for them-
selves.7  While a U.S. Tax Court ruling may not influence how all 
state and federal courts will interpret the rights of transgender people 
in other contexts, it may convince some that social expectations are 
changing and that action is required to guarantee constitutionally-
entitled protections. 
The Eighth Amendment’s history perhaps best reflects how courts 
have expanded constitutional protections in light of evolving social 
standards of decency.  The Eighth Amendment’s simple language8 
belies the array of protections it grants prison inmates and the duties it 
imposes on prison officials, including the foremost duty—to provide 
for inmates’ basic needs.9  Adequate, if minimal, health care is well 
recognized as a basic need.10   
Transgender inmates face greater struggles than much of the non-
incarcerated transgender community.  Some advocates for transsexual 
inmates’ rights argue that prisons should provide the full treatment 
series—psychotherapy, hormone therapy, and sex reassignment sur-
gery—prescribed by the World Professional Association of Trans-
gender Health’s (WPATH) Standards of Care.11  WPATH is an inter-
  
 5 Woman Becomes Nation’s 1st Transgender Trial Judge, CNSNEWS.COM 
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/woman-becomes-nations-1st-
transgender-tr. 
 6 See infra Part II.B. 
 7 See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Maggert v. Hanks, 
131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997); De’lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003); 
Praylor v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208 (5th Cir. 2005).  In these 
cases, the plaintiff inmates sued only for his or her individual healthcare—not for the 
healthcare of all transsexual inmates as a class.  Of course, transsexual inmates may 
bring such class actions for better treatment.  See Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 
1252 (S.D. W. Va. 1981). 
 8 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 9 Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]hose depriva-
tions denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’ are sufficiently 
grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”) (quoting Wilson v. 
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 
 10 Sharon Dolovitch, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 
84 N.Y.U.L. REV. 881, 881-82 (2009). 
 11 See Travis Cox, Medically Necessary Treatments for Transgender Prison-
ers and the Misguided Law in Wisconsin, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 341, 342 
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national organization that promotes greater understanding and appro-
priate care for those suffering from gender identity disorder (GID).12  
The Standards of Care represent the international medical commu-
nity’s consensus on the required care for transgender people.13  These 
advocates contend that given the unique needs of transsexuals, deny-
ing the full treatment series violates the Eighth Amendment.  How-
ever, my own analysis demonstrates that any treatments beyond psy-
chotherapy and hormones exceed the constitutionally-mandated de-
gree of care.14 
In this Note, I argue that (1) the standard for adequate medical 
care requires only sex-appropriate hormone therapies for those trans-
sexual inmates that need them, (2) sexual reassignment surgery is, in 
most cases, beyond the threshold of minimal adequate care and thus 
not required by the Eighth Amendment, and (3) prisons must provide 
housing that ensures the safety of transsexual inmates and the proper 
administration of adequate health care. 
Part I will discuss general background information concerning 
what transsexualism is, the treatments prescribed by the medical 
community, and the significant problems transsexuals face in the 
United States.  Part II will introduce the tax court case O’Donnabhain 
v. Commissioner and other indicia of the improving social, legal, and 
political situation for transsexuals.  Part III will discuss Eighth 
Amendment protections for inmate health care, and case law demon-
strating problems with current prison policies regarding care for trans-
sexual inmates.  Part IV will propose changes to prison policies so as 
to balance the respective constitutional rights and duties of inmates 
and officials. 
 
I. TRANSSEXUALISM DEFINED 
 
For most people, there is no disparity between how their body de-
velops sexually and how they self-identify their gender.  It is therefore 
difficult for many to understand the legal and social difficulties that 
transgender and transsexual people must endure in the United States.  
That our society’s standards of decency have only recently progressed 
  
(2009); Harper Jean Tobin, Note, Against the Surgical Requirement for Change of 
Legal Sex, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 393, 396 (2007). 
 12 See World Professional Association for Transgender Health: Mission 
Statement, WORLD PROF. ASS’N OF TRANSGENDER HEALTH (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://www.wpath.org/about_mission.cfm. 
 13 See HARRY BENJAMIN INT’L GEND. DYSPHORIA ASS’N, STANDARDS OF 
CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS 1 (6th ed. 2001), available at 
http://www.wpath.org/documents2/socv6.pdf [hereinafter STANDARDS OF CARE]. 
 14 See infra Part IV. 
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to the point of accepting transgender and transsexual people is best 
revealed by examination of the legal and social prejudices that sys-
tematically deny their participatory rights.  This begins with under-
standing what exactly it is about transsexualism, medically and so-
cially, that makes individuals with this condition easy prey for social 
prejudice. 
A. Understanding the Relationship between Gender 
and  Sex  
 
To understand transgender people, the distinction between sex and 
gender must also be understood.  Transgenderism exists because sex 
and gender are not necessarily identical.15  Sex is an objective physi-
cal attribute determined by an individual’s primary sex organs, the 
genitalia.16  No one has direct influence over how their own or an-
other’s sex develops in the womb.  Post-natal sex, however, may be 
decided (perhaps arbitrarily) when the child’s genitalia is ambiguous 
or disfigured by a careless circumcision.17 
Gender is completely subjective, and better understood as sense of 
self.18  Gender identity may be suppressed, but it cannot be changed.  
There is an increasing amount of scientific evidence that gender-sex 
incongruity is related to how the brain structure that governs gender 
develops in response to sex hormones in the womb.19  This does not 
mean that transgender people have brain deformities.20  Instead, the 
gender-sex incongruity only means that the brain developed under 
different hormonal influences than the rest of the body.   
It is also important to distinguish the terms “transgender” and 
“transsexual.”  Transgender people are those individuals whose sub-
jective gender does not align with their objective sex.21  “Trans-
gender” is an umbrella category that includes transsexuals as a unique 
  
 15 George R. Brown & Everett McDuffie, Health Care Policies Addressing 
Transgender Inmates in Prison Systems in the United States, 15 J. CORRECTIONAL 
HEALTH CARE 280, 280 (2009). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Sometimes performing surgeries on “intersex infants,” or those infants 
with sexually ambiguous genitalia, is not even medically necessary but merely a 
procedure for the “purposes of ‘confirming’ an earlier assignment to either male or 
female genders.” Drescher, supra note 2, at 431. 
 18 Brown, supra note 15, at 280. 
 19 Linda D. Chin, Note/Comment, A Prisoner’s Right to Transsexual Thera-
pies: A Look at Brooks v. Berg, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 151, 159 (2004); Dick F. 
Swaab, Sexual Differentiation of the Brain and Behavior, 21 BEST PRAC. & RES. 
CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 431, 436-37 (2007). 
 20 Chin, supra note 19, at 159. 
 21 Brown, supra note 15, at 280. 
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subset.22  Transsexuals are transgender individuals who feel that their 
physical sex is so divergent from their mental gender that they want to 
make the physical alterations to align their sex with their gender, or to 
make their body feel right for their mind.23   
Unfortunately, social understanding often lags behind scientific 
discovery.24  All too often, transsexualism is misconstrued as just an-
other facet of homosexuality, or degraded as a sexual perversion or a 
mere psychological delusion.25  But transsexualism does not bear rela-
tion to sexual proclivity, sexual orientation, or mental illness.26  
Rather, it is entirely concerned with self-identification of gender iden-
tity.27  No gender identity precludes anyone from being “heterosex-
ual/straight, homosexual/gay/lesbian or identify as queer.”28 
It is easier for society to dismiss and marginalize transgender 
people as exceptionally rare “freaks” when people are unaware of how 
many transgender people there are in the population.  Transgenderism 
is far from rare; one survey estimates that only 2–5 percent (one in 
fifty to one in twenty) of Americans are transgender.29  Transsexual-
ism, however, is quite rare, with birth rates of only about 0.00833 
percent (one in 12,000) male-to-female and 0.00333 percent (one in 
30,000) female-to-male individuals.30  When contrasted with an esti-
  
 22 Beth Rankin, Transsexual v. Transgender: Explaining the Intricacies, 
FUSION MAGAZINE (2004), 
http://fusion.kent.edu/archives/spring04/trans/transprint.html. 
 23 Swaab, supra note 19, at 435.  Despite this distinction, as one commenta-
tor phrased it: “[b]oth terms describe a section of the sexual minority seeking only to 
feel comfortable in their own skin.”  Rankin, supra note 22. 
 24 Ally Windsor Howell, A Comparison of the Treatment of Transgender 
Persons in the Criminal Justice Systems of Ontario, Canada, New York, and Califor-
nia, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 133, 143 (2010). 
 25 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 78 (2010). In Cuoco v. Morit-
sugu, the prison officials argued that Cuoco was not a transsexual, just a “homosexual 
who took estrogen for aesthetic purposes.” 222 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 26 See Howell, supra note 24, at 136-37. 
 27 Tobin, supra note 11, at 397. 
 28 Teaching Transgender, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 25 (Jan. 
2009), http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE_Teaching_Transgender.pdf [herein-
after NCTE]. 
 29 Transgender Issues: A Fact Sheet, TRANSGENDER L. & POL’Y INST. 1 
(2008), http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf; the transgender-
ism statistic estimates the number of individuals who “experience some degree of 
gender dysphoria.”  Id.; one population estimate for the United States gives a range 
between 7,000 and 200,000 transgender people.  Tobin, supra note 11, at 397. 
 30 Marek Mędraś & Paweł Jóźków, Transsexualism—Diagnostic and Thera-
peutic Aspects, 61 POLISH J. ENDOCRINOLOGY 412, 412 (2010).  A more recent study 
estimated a much higher prevalence of transsexualism in the population: 1 in 3,639 
male-to-females and 1 in 22,714 female-to-males.  Id. at 413.  The NCTE reports 
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mated 4–5 percent (one in twenty-five to one in twenty) of males and 
2–3 percent (one in fifty to one in thirty-three) of females being born 
homosexual,31 it is easier to comprehend how miniscule, and easily 
ignored, a sexual and social minority transsexuals are.  The real hurdle 
that transsexuals face is the social, and perhaps cultural,32 predisposi-
tion towards viewing sex and gender as a naturally aligned binary 
phenomenon.33  Our society prefers the conception that an individual 
at birth will, by biological necessity, be only a male or female in mind 
and body for life.34  For many raised according to this view, it is diffi-
cult to comprehend that sex and gender do not go hand-in-hand and 
that, in neither case, does one cause the other.  
Neither transgenderism nor transsexualism is a mental illness.  
However, transsexuals as a class suffer from a condition called “Gen-
der Identity Disorder” (GID) or “Gender Dysphoria,” which arises 
from the severity of their gender-sex incongruity.35  The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV) currently 
lists GID as a psychological disorder.36  GID is described as: 
  
transsexualism rates are between a 0.25-1 percent of the population. NCTE, supra 
note 28, at 19. 
 31 Richard Green, Transsexual Legal Rights in the United States and United 
Kingdom: Employment, Medical Treatment, and Civil Status, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 153, 153 (2010). 
 32 NCTE, supra note 28, at 19. 
 33 Howell, supra note 24, at 133.  In many, if not all facets of society and 
administration in the United States, the conventional binary gender system is used.  
 34 See Drescher, supra note 2, at 431 (“To maintain this gender binary, most 
cultures traditionally insisted that every individual be assigned to the category of 
either man or woman at birth and that individuals conform to the category to which 
they have been assigned thereafter.”). 
 35 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 581 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
 36 Id. at 580; It is an interesting point that the DSM used to list homosexual-
ity as a psychological disorder for some time as well.  The DSM-I published in 1952 
classified homosexuality as a “sociopathic personality disturbance” and the DSM-II 
published in 1968 reclassified homosexuality as a “sexual deviation” and as “sexual 
orientation disturbance.”  To accompany the removal of homosexuality as an illness 
per se from the DSM-III in 1973, the American Psychiatric Association issued this 
statement: 
Whereas homosexuality in and of itself implies no impairment in judgment, stability, 
reliability, or vocational capabilities, therefore, be it resolved that the American Psy-
chiatric Association deplores all public and private discrimination against homosexu-
als in such areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, and licensing, and 
declares that no burden of proof of such judgment, capacity, or reliability shall be 
placed on homosexuals greater than that imposed on any other persons.  Further, the 
APA supports and urges the enactment of civil rights legislation at local, state, and 
federal levels that would insure homosexual citizens the same protections now guar-
anteed to others.  Further, the APA supports and urges the repeal of all legislation 
making criminal offenses of sexual acts performed by consenting adults in private. 
 
234 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 227]  
 
(1) [a] strong and persistent cross-gender identifica-
tion (not merely a desire for any perceived cultural 
advantages of being the other sex); 
(2) [a] persistent discomfort with his or her sex or 
sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of 
that sex; 
(3) [a] disturbance [that] is not concurrent with a 
physical intersex condition; and 
(4) [a] disturbance [that] causes clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning.37 
 
Gender dysphoria has been more simply described as the “dis-
comfort felt when one’s physical gender assigned at birth is incongru-
ous with one’s gender identity.”38  Although the categorization as a 
mental disorder implies that the disturbance comes from within, ex-
ternal pressure to conform to cultural sexual norms contributes to the 
identity discomfort.39  Naturally, for many reasons, controversy re-
garding inclusion of GID in the DSM-IV abounds.40  Despite the in-
herent negative connotations of a “mental” or “psychological” disor-
der, many transsexuals recognize that their best path to receiving 
benefits under current medical policies is grounded in having a clini-
cally-categorized condition.41 
 
 
 
  
Drescher, supra note 2, at 434-35. 
 37 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 35, at 581. 
 38 Cox, supra note 11, at 343. 
 39 Judith S. Stern & Claire V. Merkine, Brian L. v. Administration for Chil-
dren’s Services: Ambivalence Toward Gender Identity Disorder as a Medical Condi-
tion, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 566, 569 (2009). 
 40 Arguments to remove GID include “societal intolerance of difference, the 
human cost of diagnostic stigmatization, using the language of psychopathology to 
describe what some consider to be normal behaviors and feelings, and . . . inappropri-
ately focusing psychiatric attention on individual diversity rather than opposing the 
social forces that oppress sexual and gender nonconformity.”  Drescher, supra note 2, 
at 429. 
 41 Id. at 441; see also Alvin Lee, Trans Models in Prison: The Medicaliza-
tion of Gender Identity and the Eighth Amendment Right to Sex Reassignment Ther-
apy, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 447, 453, 455-56 (2008). 
2012] SETTING GENDER IDENTITY FREE 235 
B. Effective Therapies for Treating Gender    
 Identity Disorder  
 
For transsexuals wanting to pursue sex transformation, WPATH 
drafted the Standards of Care.42  The Standards of Care represent the 
international medical community’s consensus on treatment of GIDs.43  
These guidelines detail a clinical sequence of escalating treatments 
that facilitate a controlled transition ensuring that patients receive only 
those treatments that are medically warranted.44  The sequence first 
calls for psychiatric therapy,45 followed by hormonal sex reassignment 
with psychiatrist approval.46  Then, the patient must complete a real-
life experience of no less than one year during which he or she lives 
fully in his or her community as the intended sex.47  Finally, after a 
successful real-life experience, and with approval of two psychiatrists, 
the patient may undergo surgical sex reassignment.48 
Given that the suffering arises from the incongruity, the only ef-
fective remedy is to bring subjective gender and objective sex into 
harmony.  The ultimate goal of the clinical process is not just physical 
transformation, but also to improve the patient’s psychological well-
being and chances for “self-fulfillment” in society.49  Without these 
therapies, transsexuals are at risk of serious psychological problems 
beyond GID, such as depression, anxiety,50 self-mutilation, and suici-
dal tendencies.51 
Unfortunately, for many transsexuals, seeking this care is prohibi-
tively expensive.52  The estimated cost for female-to-male surgery is 
  
 42 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 37 (2010). 
 43 See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 1. 
 44 Id. at 1-2 (describing the Standard’s gatekeeping function as a “clinical 
threshold [that] is passed when concerns, uncertainties, and questions about gender 
identity persist during a person’s development, become so intense as to seem to be the 
most important aspect of a person’s life, or prevent the establishment of a relatively 
unconflicted gender identity”).   
 45 See id. at 3, 11-13. 
 46 See id. at 3, 8, 13-14. 
 47 See id. at 3, 17-18.  
 48 See id. at 3, 8, 18-22. 
 49 Chin, supra note 19, at 160 (quoting STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, 
at 1).   
 50 Lee, supra note 41, at 450. 
 51 Amy Zimmerman Hodges, Identifying the Linguistic Boundaries of Sex: 
Court Language Choice in Decisions Regarding the Availability of Sex and Procrea-
tion, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 413, 437 (2005). 
 52 Sydney Tarzwell, The Gender Lines Are Marked with Razor Wire: Ad-
dressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender 
Prisoners, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167, 174 (2006). 
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approximately $50,000.53  Male-to-female surgeries can cost as much 
as $100,000.54  Comparatively, hormone treatment is inexpensive.  
Hormones can cost between $300 and $2,400 per year, depending on 
the brand and dosage prescribed.55  In a single year, the Department of 
Corrections (DoC) spent only $4,400 on hormones for two inmates.56  
These procedures and treatments are rarely covered by health insur-
ance or government-funded health-care assistance, and most trans-
gender people do not even have insurance for regular health-care 
needs.57  Only recently has the Internal Revenue Service granted 
medical expense tax deductions to help defray the costs.58  Although 
the cost of treatment is high, it is not the highest hurdle transsexuals 
must overcome.  Due to discrimination in the workplace and housing 
market, many transsexuals cannot adequately provide for themselves 
or pay for the procedures59 that will improve their quality of life.     
C. Social and Economic Problems Transsexuals 
 Endure  
 
As suggested earlier, GID may be the result of external social 
forces.  Unlike racial and ethnic minorities, homosexuals, and the 
physically and mentally disabled,60 neither transgender people nor 
transsexuals are explicitly protected by federal antidiscrimination 
laws.  While transsexuals have a legally recognized psychiatric condi-
tion that would otherwise be covered by the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, the Act specifically excludes transsexuals, as well as trans-
vestism and GID.61   
  
 53 Bradley A. Sultan, Transsexual Prisoners: How Much Treatment is 
Enough?, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1195, 1205 (2003). 
 54 Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 55 Sex Reassignment Surgery Cost, COSTHELPER, 
http://www.costhelper.com/cost/health/sex-reassignment-surgery.html (last updated 
Aug. 2009). 
 56 Cox, supra note 11, at 361. 
 57 Transgender Issues: A Fact Sheet, TRANSGENDER LAW, 
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 
2011). 
 58 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 77 (2010). 
 59 Preliminary Findings: National Transgender Discrimination Survey, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE 1 
(Nov. 2009), http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE_prelim_survey_econ.pdf 
[hereinafter NTDS]. 
 60 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006), amended by the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 12101 (2008). 
 61 Green, supra note 31, at 158.  
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has also historically not 
granted transgender and transsexual plaintiffs explicit protection.  
Beginning in the 1970s, when plaintiffs alleged that they were fired 
due to their transsexual status, the circuit courts rejected arguments 
that the term ‘sex’ as protected under Title VII incorporates ‘gender,’ 
which encompasses transsexuals,62 and held that the statute only 
maintains the “traditional notions of ‘sex.’”63  The Ninth Circuit sup-
ported this plain reading conclusion by denying that a narrow interpre-
tation of Title VII raised equal protection issues, asserting that trans-
sexuals are neither a suspect class nor a “discrete and insular minor-
ity” as categorized by an “immutable characteristic determined solely 
by the accident of birth.”64  The Seventh Circuit went so far as to say 
that, “even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created from 
what remains of a man,” discrimination must be based on being a 
woman and not a transsexual for Title VII to apply.65  This rule fore-
closed any hope for relief in the workplace for many years. 
Discrimination against transgender and transsexual people is 
based on either direct knowledge of gender identity status or noncon-
forming expressions of gender identity.66  A 2009 survey of several 
thousand transgender and transsexual people in the United States re-
ported that 13 percent of transgender people were unemployed, 26 
percent had been fired due to their transgender status, and 97 percent 
reported being harassed at work.67  The poverty rates are even more 
shocking.  Twenty-seven percent earn less than $20,000 and 15 per-
cent earning less than $10,000; in the general population, only 7 per-
  
 62 Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
 63 Id.  The court even noted that the prohibition on sex discrimination was 
itself barely included and was added last minute “without prior hearing or debate.”  
Id. at 662. 
 64 Id. at 663 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)); see 
also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667, F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (agreeing 
with the Ninth Circuit that “the word ‘sex’ in Title VII is to be given its traditional 
definition, rather than an expansive interpretation,” which does not protect gender 
identity or a plaintiff not properly classified as either male or female); Ulane v. E. 
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he words of Title VII 
do not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual identity disorder . . . 
.”). 
 65 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087. 
 66 JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., INJUSTICE 
AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION 
SURVEY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2011), available at 
http://transequality.org/PDFs/NTDS_Exec_Summary.pdf. 
 67 NTDS, supra note 59, at 1-2. 
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cent reported less than $10,000.68  It is clearly evident that transsexual 
individuals disproportionately suffer from economic inequalities.  
When it comes to housing discrimination, there are no protec-
tions,69 and given their higher rates of poverty, many transgender peo-
ple end up living on the streets.  In the 2009 survey, 11 percent of 
transgender people had been evicted due to their transgender status, 
and 19 percent had been, or were currently, homeless.70   
Without a stable place to live or work in the “legitimate” econ-
omy,71 many transsexuals must choose between poverty or criminal 
activity in the sex and drug trades to pay for black market health care 
or just to survive day-to-day.72  As a result, transsexuals have become 
an overrepresented minority in prisons where they face even greater 
neglect and victimization.73  The total U.S. combined state and federal 
prison population is just over two million inmates.74  As of January 
2011, there were roughly 210,000 inmates in federal prisons.75  A 
2007 survey estimated that 50 to 100 transsexual inmates were held in 
federal facilities.76  Comparing even the more common male-to-
female transsexual birth rate of one in 12,000 to the estimated rate in 
federal prison of one in 2,100,77 it becomes evident that transsexual 
incarceration rates are disproportionate to those of the general popula-
tion.  There must be some sociological or economic reasons behind 
this, because it is clear that being born with a gender-sex incongruity 
does not make one naturally more inclined to commit crime.  Fortu-
  
 68 Id. at 2. 
 69 See Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 167-68. 
 70 NTDS, supra note 59, at 3.  
 71 Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 167-68. 
 72 Cox, supra note 11, at 359; see Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 170; Katrina C. 
Rose, When is an Attempted Rape Not an Attempted Rape? When the Victim is a 
Transsexual—Schwenk v. Hartford: The Intersection of Prison Rape, Title VII and 
Societal Willingness to Dehumanize Transsexuals, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 505, 538 (2001).  
 73 Brown, supra note 15, at 281-82; Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 168; Chris-
tine Peek, Breaking Out of the Prison Hierarchy: Transgender Prisoners, Rape, and 
the Eighth Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1211, 1218 (2004); see also Dana 
O’Day-Senior, The Forgotten Frontier? Healthcare for Transgender Detainees in 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detention, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 453, 470 (2008) 
(noting that transgender immigrants are particularly at-risk for detention and incar-
ceration by ICE). 
 74 Correctional Populations, BUREAU JUST. STATS. (2009) available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/corr2tab.cfm. 
 75 Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp (last updated Oct. 29, 2011). 
 76 Brown, supra note 15, at 281.  The estimated rate for state facilities is 500 
to 750 transsexual inmates.  Id. 
 77 Mędraś & Jóźków, supra note 30, at 412. 
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nately, it appears that some of the factors—access to insurance, politi-
cal representation, and judicial protection—that contribute to this dis-
proportionate incarceration rate are improving, giving hope that these 
rates will become more proportionate and transsexual individuals will 
have a greater chance at social fulfillment.   
II. LEGAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS DEMONSTRATING 
INCREASED ACCEPTANCE OF TRANSSEXUALS 
A. O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner 
 
In February 2010, the U.S. Tax Court decided a precedent-setting 
case in an “issue of first impression”78 that significantly advanced the 
interests and legal recognition of transsexuals in the United States.   
O’Donnabhain was born a genetic male with unambiguous male 
genitalia.79  She lived as a man, and even raised a family, despite feel-
ing very uncomfortable in the male gender role.80  While in psycho-
therapy, O’Donnabhain revealed her belief that she was really female 
despite having a male body.81  Due to the discord between her subjec-
tive gender identity and objective sex, she suffered from depression, 
low self-esteem, and anxiety.82  Consequently, O’Donnabhain’s psy-
chiatrist started her on treatment in accordance with the WPATH 
Standards of Care.  O’Donnabhain completed the full course, culmi-
nating in the transformation from male to female, and responded posi-
tively both emotionally and physically.83  Because these procedures 
were not covered by her health insurance or any government-funded 
health-care system, O’Donnabhain itemized the costs as deductions on 
her federal income tax return under I.R.C. § 213.84 
I.R.C. § 213 permits taxpayers  to deduct medical expenses that 
are “not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care 
of the taxpayer . . . to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent 
of adjusted gross income.”85  Medical care includes “the diagnosis, 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the pur-
pose of affecting any structure or function of the body. . . .”86  Medical 
  
 78 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 53 (2010). 
 79 Id. at 35. 
 80 Id.   
 81 Id. at 36. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See id. at 39-41. 
 84 Id. at 42, 49. 
 85 I.R.C. § 213(a) (2011).  
 86 Id. § 213(d)(1)(A). 
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care does not, however, cover cosmetic surgery “unless the surgery or 
procedure is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from . . . a 
congenital abnormality. . . .”87  The purpose of cosmetic surgery is 
only to improve appearances; it does not “meaningfully promote the 
proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease.”88  
The issue before the court was whether O’Donnabhain’s sex reas-
signment hormone treatments and surgeries were merely cosmetic 
alterations, or actually treated a disease or condition.  
The court began its analysis by stating that tax deductions are 
strictly confined to expenses for medical care that prevents or allevi-
ates physical or mental defects or illnesses.89  The court ruled that 
GID constituted a disease under § 213.90  The court then evaluated the 
relationship between the malady and the treatment, based on two key 
values.  First, the court stated that in matters relating to the health care 
of an individual, it gives deference to the medical judgments of the 
practitioner who treated the patient-taxpayer.91  Second, given a le-
gitimate medical concern, the treatment should “bear a direct or 
proximate therapeutic relation” to the need.92  The tax court therefore 
concluded that hormone therapy and genital reassignment surgery are 
effective treatments for GID.93  However, the court noted that breast 
augmentation surgery was not an effective treatment and was merely 
cosmetic.94  The court, therefore, allowed O’Donnabhain to deduct the 
expenditures for her transformation other than for breast augmenta-
tion.95 
This decision exemplifies expanding protections and assistance 
for transgender and transsexual interests in the United States, and 
marks a trend toward easing the financial burdens of those wishing to 
make the transformation.  Furthermore, analyzing what is or is not 
taxed, such as cigarettes and alcohol, or what is tax deductible, such 
as charitable donations and necessary medical treatments, may serve 
as a good measure for what the public values.  In regards to transsex-
ual inmates, this decision introduced two compelling factors related to 
  
 87 Id. § 213(d)(9)(A). 
 88 Id. § 213(d)(9)(B). 
 89 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 49 (2010). 
 90 Id. at 59, 63.  
 91 Id. at 64. 
 92 Id. at 65 (quoting Havey v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949)). 
 93 Id. at 66-67. 
 94 Id. at 72-73 (“Petitioner has not. . .adduced evidence that the breast aug-
mentation surgery ameliorated a deformity within the meaning of section 
213(d)(9)(A). . .[and] [t]he parties have stipulated that petitioner’s breast augmenta-
tion ‘did not promote the proper function of her breasts.’”) 
 95 Id. at 77. 
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GID treatment: the care provided must meet the patient-specific diag-
nosis and only qualified and experienced medical personnel may 
make decisions regarding that care.   
 
B. Positive Indications of Evolving Standards of  
 Decency 
 
Transgender and transsexual people have not only made progress 
in the courthouse, but also among the general population, in congres-
sional halls, and with important initiatives that will improve their so-
cial standing and quality of life.   
Electoral success is a very clear signal that a political and social 
minority is gaining traction, demonstrating that the people trust them 
to manage public affairs.  In November 2010, Victoria Kolakowski 
was elected to California’s Superior Court in Alameda County.96  Ko-
lakowski underwent sex reassignment surgery in 1991 and is the first 
openly transgender trial court judge in the United States.97  While it is 
likely that other sitting judges are transgender, Kolakowski is the first 
to be elected despite being open about her transsexual status and sur-
gery.98  This victory demonstrates a remarkable step for transgender 
people into the public arena.  Kolakowski is the most prominent ex-
ample of electoral success, but she is not alone in making political 
headway for the transgender community.99 
Legislation has also been developed at local, state, and federal 
levels to provide explicit protections against gender identity-based 
discrimination for transgender individuals.  Since 1994, the Employ-
ment Nondiscrimination Act has been repeatedly put before Congress 
in one form or another.  Despite widespread support among House 
members and the general public, it has not yet passed.100  While there 
are no federal protections yet, thirteen states and the District of Co-
  
 96 Woman Becomes Nation’s 1st Transgender Trial Judge, supra note 5; see 
also Setbacks and Victories at the Polls: Transgender Candidates Win!, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://transequality.org/news10.html#midterm [hereinafter Transgender Candidates 
Win!]. 
 97 Woman Becomes Nation’s 1st Transgender Trial Judge, supra note 5. 
 98 Id.  Admittedly, Kolakowski was elected in a county near San Francisco, a 
municipality well-known for progressive policies and legislation regarding homo-
sexuals and transsexuals. 
 99 Transgender Candidates Win!, supra note 96. 
 100 ENDA by the Numbers, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 2 (2010), 
http://www.transequality.org/Resources/enda_by_the_numbers.pdf; as of 2010 there 
were 202 representatives co-sponsoring the bill and according to a 2008 survey of 
New York voters 78% were in favor of “anti-discrimination measures that include 
gender identity and sexual orientation.”  Id. 
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lumbia have passed antidiscrimination laws prohibiting discrimination 
based on gender identity.  Unfortunately, these protect little more than 
a third of the U.S. population.101   
However, the circuit courts have demonstrated a progressive will-
ingness to protect transsexuals under Title VII.  The nation’s circuit 
courts recognize that although the exact wording of Title VII may not 
protect transsexuals, there are other characteristics of a transsexual’s 
identity that can serve as the basis for a cause of action.  Beginning 
with Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit upheld a verdict in favor 
of the transsexual plaintiff on grounds that the discrimination 
stemmed from the plaintiff’s “failure to conform to sex stereotypes by 
expressing less masculine and more feminine mannerisms and appear-
ance.”102  However, this new interpretation is not without limits.  An 
employer may discharge a transsexual employee if that employee’s 
gender identity expression raises an overriding concern.  In Etsitty v. 
Utah Transit Authority, the Tenth Circuit upheld the employer’s right 
to fire a transsexual employee who used women’s public restrooms 
despite still having male genitalia.103  The court recognized that the 
Utah Transit Authority’s potential liability constituted a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” for releasing Etsitty, despite the fact that 
her using a women’s restroom was a nonconforming behavioral ex-
pression of her gender identity.104  Although a transsexual’s gender 
identity and expression are protected, he or she must still be careful 
not to cross practical boundaries between the sexes.   
Homeless and evicted transsexuals also have hope for greater 
housing protection.  In January 2011, the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) announced new regulations that will 
ensure that all eligible people, regardless of gender identity or sexual 
orientation, can seek housing assistance.105  HUD based its decision in 
  
 101 Transgender Issues: A Fact Sheet, supra note 57. 
 102 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004); The court was 
reflecting the values established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 
(1989) (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group.”). 
Id. at 572; see also Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 735 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding a discrimination claim for a plaintiff alleging that he had been fired for 
“grooming deficiencies” and not “acting masculine enough”). 
 103 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 104 Id.; see also Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 Fed. Appx. 
492, 493-94 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding the school’s decision to prohibit a transsexual 
from using a women’s bathroom until she “could prove completion of sex reassign-
ment surgery” for safety reasons). 
 105 NCTE: HUD Proposes New Regulation –Includes Gender Identity, NAT’L 
CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://transequality.org/news.html. 
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part on the data gathered in the 2009 survey by the National Center 
for Transgender Equality (NCTE) and the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force, which was “evidence demonstrating the dire need for 
housing protections for the transgender community.”106  The new 
regulations include provisions which will make clear that all HUD 
public housing programs are open to eligible lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) families, prohibit landlords from asking 
about gender identity or sexual orientation, and prohibit financial 
lenders from discriminating on the basis of gender identity or sexual 
orientation.107  In response to this monumental advancement in trans-
gender and transsexual interests, Mara Kiesling, NCTE’s executive 
director, said that these regulations will profoundly affect many lives 
because “[e]very American needs and deserves a home.”108 
The transgender community is also making headway in the health-
care arena.  Transsexuals have great difficulty obtaining insurance 
coverage when they disclose their transsexual status or any “transi-
tion-related medical history.”109  Fortunately, some health insurers are 
beginning to provide coverage for transsexual procedures when there 
is a demonstrated need.110  In 2008, the American Medical Associa-
tion started requesting that health insurers cover more transgender and 
transsexual health-care needs.111  The Affordable Care Act also makes 
affording health insurance or receiving coverage under existing plans 
easier for transgender people.112  What the bill provides for transsexu-
als is increased access to insurance for a group that has great difficulty 
due to high rates of unemployment and poverty, protection from being 
denied or dropped from coverage, and bans on discrimination.113  
  
 106 Id.; this data is discussed supra Part I.C. 
 107 NCTE: HUD Proposes New Regulations—Includes Gender Identity, supra 
note 105. 
 108 Id.  
 109 Transgender Health and the Law: Identifying and Fighting Health Care 
Discrimination, TRANSGENDER L. CTR. 1 (July 2004), 
http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf/Health%20Law%20fact%20sheet.pdf.  
According to a 1997 survey by the Transgender Community Health Project of the San 
Francisco Department of Health, 52 percent of male-to-females were without insur-
ance and 41 percent of female-to-males were without insurance.  See Transgender 
Issues: A Fact Sheet, supra note 57.  
 110 Cox, supra note 11, at 363. 
 111 AMA Supports Transgender Care, Hormones, Sex-Reassignment Therapy, 
TEACHTHEFACTS.ORG (June 19, 2008), 
http://vigilance.teachthefacts.org/2008/06/ama-supports-transgender-care-
hormones.html. 
 112 Health Care Reform Signed into Law: How Will It Impact Transgender 
People?, NAT’L CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://www.transequality.org/news10.html#hcr. 
 113 Id. 
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While this reform provides great assistance to millions of uninsured 
Americans, including thousands of transsexuals, it contains no provi-
sions covering transgender-specific treatments.114  Although this act 
does not extend protections to the extent many transcommunity advo-
cates desire, this reform still significantly reduces, and will hopefully 
eliminate, the amount of discrimination transgender and transsexual 
people face in the medical insurance industry.115     
These advancements demonstrate that the American people are 
increasingly accepting transgender and transsexual people, and the 
representatives and industries that serve them are also beginning to 
take heed.  While this progress may not go as far as some might want, 
these are steps in the right direction and provide a foundation for ad-
vancement in a number of areas, including the penal system.   
 
III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROVISIONS FOR INMATE HEALTH 
CARE 
 
The Eighth Amendment provides that there shall be no “cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”116  The Supreme Court has stated that 
this amendment embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, 
civilized standards, humanity, and decency. . . .”117  When the Found-
ing Fathers wrote the Eighth Amendment they could not have con-
templated the specific needs of prisoners today.  Indeed, their only 
goal in drafting the amendment was to “proscribe tortures and other 
barbarous methods of punishment.”118  As a result, the protections 
afforded to prisoners under the Eighth Amendment have necessarily 
expanded along with society’s evolving standards of decency.119   
Distilling the Eighth Amendment’s broad ideals, two require-
ments are placed on the justice and correctional systems.  First, pun-
ishments are constitutional only if they are lawfully handed down by 
the state; any conditions imposed by prison officials beyond what is 
necessary to execute that sentence are a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.120  Second, state and federal governments have a consti-
  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. 
 116 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 117 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 
404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). 
 118 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 119 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (explaining that the 
clause forbidding cruel and unusual punishments “is not fastened to the obsolete but 
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”). 
 120 See Dolovitch, supra note 10, at 883-85, 892-93; the Supreme Court has 
declared that “[w]hile the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to 
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tutional duty to provide for inmates’ basic needs;121 any refusal to 
meet these needs is a violation of the Eighth Amendment.122  One 
district court avowed its ardent belief that the Constitution protects the 
inmate’s right to humane treatment, not in order to found a nation that 
“coddles criminals,” but to form a society of decent people who “do 
not allow other human beings in their custody to suffer needlessly 
from serious illness or injury.”123 
A.   Standard for Expanding Eighth Amendment   
    Protections  
 
Courts recognize a strong moral and legal correlation between so-
ciety’s standards of decency and Eighth Amendment protections.  
This correlation may be helpful, if not necessary, in convincing the 
courts that a class or minority is constitutionally entitled to greater 
protections in the penal system.  Although it has not yet crafted a test 
with exacting elements, the Supreme Court has established general 
guidelines that help demonstrate that society has changed its percep-
tion of the decency or humanity of specific penal conditions or pun-
ishments.124 
The Court first suggested these guidelines in 1958 in Trop v. Dul-
les, where the plaintiff had lost his U.S. citizenship after being court-
martialed for wartime desertion during World War II.125  Concerned 
that the Nationality Act of 1940 granted the military the power to de-
cide who may “continue to be Americans and who shall be state-
less,”126 the Court determined that “[c]itizenship is not a license that 
expires upon misbehavior” unless voluntarily relinquished or ex-
pressly abandoned by language or conduct.127  The Court stated that 
punishment wielded by the state must be within the appropriate scope 
of the Eighth Amendment, which is neither “precise” nor “static.”128  
Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment’s power and meaning is drawn 
  
assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
 121 Howell, supra note 24, at 145. 
 122 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (“When the State by the 
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him 
unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic needs…it 
transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 123 Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 124 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 125 Trop, 356 U.S. at 87. 
 126 Id. at 90. 
 127 Id. at 92.  
 128 Id. at 100-01.  
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from “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”129  The Court reinstated Trop’s citizenship because 
it found that to destroy an individual’s political existence and partici-
pation in organized society is “a form of punishment more primitive 
than torture.”130 
Later, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of capital punishment for murder131 and established guide-
lines based on the moral maxim it recognized eighteen years earlier.  
The Court found an “assessment of contemporary values” reflected in 
“objective indicia” to be helpful, though not conclusive, in evaluating 
certain punishments.132  These objective indicia include legislative 
response to judicial decisions,133 decisions by the “directly involved” 
juries,134 and whether the punishment “comports with the basic con-
cept of human dignity.”135  Using these rather broad criteria, the Court 
found that society still placed great value on capital punishment and 
did not rule that its use to punish the most heinous criminals was un-
constitutional.136 
One year later, the Supreme Court was asked to review capital 
punishment’s constitutionality in regard to rape in Coker v. Geor-
gia.137  The Court applied the analysis used in Gregg,138 but found that 
where society still accepted capital punishment for murder, it was no 
longer appropriate for rape.139  The specific findings were that legisla-
tures in many states had responded to prior judicial decisions by 
eliminating capital punishment for rape,140 at least nine out of ten ju-
ries did not sentence convicted rapists to death,141 and that death is 
  
 129 Id. at 101. 
 130 Id. at 101.  
 131 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976). 
 132 Id. at 173.  
 133 Id. at 179.  The Supreme Court generally believes that the will and values 
of the people are reflected in the actions of their elected representatives. See id. at 
180-81.   
 134 Id. at 181 (The Court sees the jury’s value as “maintain[ing] a link be-
tween contemporary community values and the penal system.” (quoting Witherspoon 
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)). 
 135 Id. at 182; punishments must be penologically justified and not cause 
gratuitous suffering.  Id. at 183. 
 136 Id.  (“[C]apital punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at 
particularly offensive conduct.”). 
 137 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 586 (1977). 
 138 Id. at 592. 
 139 Id. at 593-94. 
 140 Id. at 594. 
 141 Id. at 597.  
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disproportionate to the crime.142  The Court, therefore, reversed 
Coker’s death sentence.143 
When the courts are convinced that society, as reflected by these 
indicia, has sufficiently altered its valuation of a punishment’s suit-
ability, constitutional interpretation may shift accordingly.  This stan-
dard is not limited to evaluating punishments, but extends to analysis 
of the penological conditions that accompany the implementation of 
those punishments.  If a plaintiff can demonstrate that society places 
value on improving prison conditions, then the courts may ensure that 
prison officials properly observe inmates’ new or expanded rights.   
B. Prison Health Care under the Eighth Amendment 
 
As society shifted away from quick corporal punishment in favor 
of longer incarceration, prison conditions imposed on inmates became 
more important.  Accordingly, Eighth Amendment interpretations had 
to adapt as well.  One very important change in Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence is that it now includes a requirement that inmates re-
ceive health care from the institutions that incarcerate them.144  The 
Supreme Court determined that the principles the Eighth Amendment 
embodies145 require the states to provide this care because inmates 
rely on those authorities for their wellbeing.146   
Although prisoners have a right to health care, this right is not un-
limited.  Prisons are not required to comply with all requests or ex-
pend all available resources to ensure that prisoners get every desir-
able creature comfort.  Judge Posner affirmed this in Maggert v. 
Hanks, stating that “[a] prison is not required by the Eighth Amend-
ment to give a prisoner medical care that is as good as he would re-
ceive if he were a free person, let alone an affluent free person.”147  
While the degree of care an inmate may or should receive is always a 
  
 142 Id.  This is not to say that the Court was unsympathetic to the victims.  
Indeed, it recognized that, following murder, this crime is the “ultimate violation of 
self” and “undermines the community’s sense of security.”  However, the Court was 
also forced to recognize that “[l]ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape 
victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not 
beyond repair.”  Id. at 597-98. 
 143 Id. at 600. 
 144 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
 145 Id. at 102; Debra Sherman Tedeschi, The Predicament of the Transsexual 
Prisoner, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 27, 28 ((1995); Chin, supra note 19, at 
165 (quoting Eighth Amendment principles from Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 
579 (8th Cir. 1968)). 
 146 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
 147 Chin, supra note 19, at 162 (quoting Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 
(7th Cir. 1997)). 
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matter of judicial discretion, there is no question that the inmate is 
entitled to some degree of health care.  People may ask why convicts 
are entitled to health care when there are so many law-abiding citizens 
who have no access to adequate, if any, health care.  The simple, 
though perhaps unpopular, answer is that the Supreme Court has es-
tablished that inmates have an affirmative constitutional right to insti-
tutionally-provided health care, whereas the non-incarcerated popula-
tion does not.148 
Estelle v. Gamble established the general principle that all prison-
ers have a constitutional right to government-funded health care for 
“serious medical needs.”149  Estelle addressed inmates generally, as 
opposed to transsexual inmates specifically.  The Supreme Court rea-
soned that denying medical treatment may result in “physical torture 
or a lingering death,” the kind of suffering which serves no penologi-
cal purpose.150  From this, the Court established the “deliberate indif-
ference” standard, which states that the “deliberate indifference [of 
prison authorities] to serious medical needs [of inmates] constitutes 
the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”151  A finding of de-
liberate indifference may result from a doctor improperly treating a 
prisoner’s needs or other officials intentionally denying, delaying, or 
interfering with a prisoner’s access to proper treatment.152  However, a 
medical professional’s decision to not pursue a particular treatment 
option does not, by itself, constitute cruel and unusual punishment.153  
Negligence and malpractice are also insufficient to bring a claim un-
der the Eighth Amendment.154  The Court, therefore, rejected Gam-
ble’s claim for “lack of diagnosis and inadequate treatment” on the 
grounds that, while greater diagnosis may have been necessary, it was 
a medical decision not to pursue more.155  The prison doctors did not 
deny him care; they just did not do everything possible to treat his 
injury.  This effectively established that only some treatment must be 
provided for serious medical needs in order to comply with the Eighth 
Amendment.  This left open the question of how much care inmates 
deserve and what reaches the level of a “serious medical need.”156  
  
 148 Id. at 166.  
 149 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
 150 Id. at 103 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). 
 151 Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976)).  
 152 Id. at 104-05. 
 153 Id. at 107.   
 154 Id. at 106. 
 155 Id. at 107; see also Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975) 
(“Questions of medical judgment are not subject to judicial review.”). 
 156 Chin, supra note 19, at 166 (quoting Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 
(2d Cir. 2003)). 
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Unfortunately, there is no clear standard by which to make bright line 
determinations.157  Courts have wrestled with multiple definitions of 
serious medical need that are similar only in that they can be easily 
circumvented with a plausible excuse by a disinterested prison offi-
cial.158   
The Supreme Court further illuminated the deliberate indifference 
standard in Farmer v. Brennan where it considered the complaint of a 
preoperative male-to-female plaintiff who, despite her greater vulner-
ability, was placed in the prison’s male general population that had a 
known “violent environment and a history of inmate assaults.”159  The 
Supreme Court decided that a prison official is not deliberately indif-
ferent unless he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 
health or safety.”160  The Court further elaborated that officials must 
know facts “from which the inference could be drawn that a substan-
tial risk of serious harm exists” and actually draw that inference.161  
Unfortunately, an objective standard of obviousness is inappropri-
ate.162  The Court held that a plaintiff need not show that the official 
intended the harm or knew of a specific risk, but only that the official 
acted despite knowing there was a risk of harm to someone.163  The 
Court, however, allowed officials to elude liability by showing that 
even the obvious escaped them.164  
These are the tests that transsexual inmates must satisfy in order 
to obtain medical care for GID.165  The key issue is whether there are 
sufficient facts for the prison official, most likely the prison doctor, to 
  
 157 Cox, supra note 11, at 348. 
 158 Id.  One option is a need that “has been diagnosed by a physician as man-
dating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recog-
nize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”  Id. (quoting Guttierez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 
1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997)).  Another possibility is a need “where ‘the failure to treat 
a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain.’’”  Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 
(9th Cir. 1992)) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)). 
 159 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830-31 (1994). 
 160 Id. at 837. 
 161 Id.  
 162 Id. at 841; the Supreme Court unfortunately expressed no fear that without 
an objective test prison officials could easily ignore obvious dangers to inmates.  Id. 
at 842.  One commentator believes that this standard “creates incentives for officers 
not to notice, despite the fact that when prison officials do not pay attention, prisoners 
may be exposed to the worst forms of suffering and abuse.” Dolovitch, supra note 10, 
at 892 (emphasis in original). 
 163 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; the Court reiterates later that the official must 
actually prove that he was unaware of an obvious risk to an inmate’s health or safety.  
Id. at 844. 
 164 Id. at 843 n.8. 
 165 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 62, n.40 (2010). 
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know that the inmate is transsexual and draw the inference that treat-
ment for GID is needed.166  This question of fact may initially seem to 
require that the inmate prove that he or she is a transsexual suffering 
from GID.  However, it actually requires that the prisons or prison 
systems have medical staff available that can appropriately diagnose 
transsexualism because a lay inmate cannot ground a claim on a mere 
self-diagnosis.  A proper medical diagnosis will resolve that question 
of fact and provide a clear basis from which the physician can draw 
the required inference that the inmate requires treatment.   
There is, of course, no constitutional requirement to provide in-
mates with nonessential medical procedures.167  Given that many non-
essential procedures are not covered by health insurance for the tax-
paying public who pay the inmates’ medical bills, it would be inap-
propriate to cover such procedures for inmates.168  Judge Posner 
viewed GID care as nonessential, saying that “gender dysphoria is not 
generally considered a severe enough condition to warrant expensive 
treatment at the expense of others than the person suffering from 
it.”169  Fortunately, medical science has progressed in the fifteen years 
since Judge Posner’s writing, and now seven U.S. Courts of Appeals 
and the Supreme Court have recognized that GID qualifies as a seri-
ous medical need requiring appropriate medical attention.170  That 
alone is sufficient to warrant some treatment for diagnosed transsexu-
als.  But the specific level of treatment required largely remains unan-
swered.  The cases that have attempted to resolve the issue are dis-
cussed below. 
 
 
 
  
 166 See Praylor v. Texas Dep’t Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208 (5th Cir. 
2005); Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 167 Chin, supra note 19, at 151-52 & n.6.  (“The author is not suggesting that 
GID is not the right choice for many transgender individuals.  The author is arguing 
that inmates should not benefit from surgeries that are arguably not necessary to keep 
them alive.”). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Maggert, 131 F.3d at 672. 
 170 O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 62, n.40; see also De’lonta v. Angelone, 330 
F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003);Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 
1987); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325-27 (8th Cir. 1988); Phillips v. Michigan 
Dep’t of Corr., 932 F. 2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 
(1994); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 
222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000); Allard v. Gomez, 9 F. App’x 793, 794 (9th Cir. 
2001); Praylor, 430 F.3d at 1209; Maggert, 131 F.3d at 671.  
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C.  Current Prison Policies Regarding Transsexual 
 Inmate Health Care  
 
Many medical uncertainties are resolved by the policies that legis-
latures or administrative departments draft as guidance for prison offi-
cials and medical staff.  These policies generally limit the medical 
care a prison physician can administer.171  The health care that trans-
sexuals receive for GID is very restricted.  The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons’ policy states: 
 
It is the policy of the Bureau to maintain a transsexual 
inmate at the level of change existing upon admission.  
Should the [Bureau] determine that either progressive 
or regressive treatment changes are indicated, the 
Medical Director must approve these prior to imple-
mentation.  The use of hormones to maintain secon-
dary sexual characteristics may be continued at ap-
proximately the same levels as prior to incarceration 
(with appropriate documentation from community 
physicians/hospitals) and with the Medical Director’s 
approval.172 
 
This policy, and others like it, freezes the degree of care available to a 
transsexual inmate.  This might be acceptable for those transsexuals 
who were receiving treatment before incarceration, but not for inmates 
who might be diagnosed while in prison.  In some cases, incarceration 
might be an inmate’s first opportunity for real diagnosis and health 
care. 
While inflexible policies may seem unfavorable, having no writ-
ten policy may be even worse, because it subjects transsexual inmates 
to the risk that prison officials, with full discretion, will make deci-
  
 171 Policy Documents, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/DataSource/execute/dsPolicyLoc (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).  It 
is worth noting that these healthcare policies range between three and seventeen years 
old and are possibly based on outdated scientific studies. A 2009 survey reported that 
nineteen states have no polices for managing transsexual inmates and twenty-five 
states including the District of Columbia and the Bureau of Prisons had polices.  
Brown & McDuffie, supra note 15, at 283-84.  
 172 Sultan, supra note 53, at 1218 n.171; this policy is currently under attack 
in federal court and may likely be repealed in favor of a more flexible standard.  
Jillian T. Weiss, Incarcerated Transgender Woman Can Pursue Case for Appropriate 
Medical Care, THE BILERIC PROJECT (June 11, 2010), 
http://www.bilerico.com/2010/06/incarcerated_transgender_woman_can_pursue_case
_for.php. 
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sions “primarily informed by bias or other inappropriate considera-
tions.”173  But even if there are written policies, the degree of under-
standing of the policy author presents yet another problem.  Despite 
the fact that these policies explicitly address treatment standards for 
transsexual inmates suffering from GID, there is no requirement that 
anyone involved in the drafting process have any experience with GID 
care or transsexual issues.174 
Providing transsexual inmates with the appropriate level of treat-
ment necessitates a change in health-care policy on both the state and 
federal levels.  The patchwork of state policies and troublesome ad-
herence to those policies demonstrates the risks involved in mixing 
flat prohibitions and too much official discretion.  The goal, therefore, 
should be to craft a universal policy that gives prison medical officials 
the latitude to provide the health care necessary to treat transsexual 
inmates based on their individual medical needs, but includes suffi-
cient guidelines to balance what the inmate may request and what the 
doctor may provide.  The policy should also be written or reviewed by 
medical and legal professionals who have experience dealing with 
GID needs and issues. 
 
D.  Past Decisions on Transsexual Inmate Health Care 
      Point to a Better Policy 
 
Over the past two decades, the federal circuit courts have decided 
several cases dealing with treatments for inmates suffering from GID.  
Although not all were decided in the transsexual inmate’s favor, each 
exposed the strengths and weaknesses of current policies and official 
actions.  These cases also highlight the remarkable difference between 
some care and adequate care.  Taken together, these cases suggest 
  
 173 Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 197; the risk of harm to inmates from a lack of 
official policy has been demonstrated in other circumstances, such as inadequate 
housing, where courts have found the prison officials liable: “As a result of an insuf-
ficient number of jailers, the lack of written standards or policies by the jail admini-
stration concerning jail inspection and the inadequate communication between the jail 
floors, the security of the jail and the safety of the inmates is put into serious jeop-
ardy.”  Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1269 (S.D. W. Va. 1981).  The court 
also found those administrators neglected their medical duties because they did not 
have medical professionals screen or examine inmates upon arrival, sufficient medical 
supplies, an equipped medical facility with medical personnel present, or the ability to 
arrange care by psychiatrists, psychologists, or other mental health personnel.  Id. at 
1272-73; Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[The warden] re-
fused to hear Cuoco’s complaints, remarking that Cuoco ‘should act like a man the 
way God intended.’”). 
 174 Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 208. 
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elements for a better medical standard that balance the respective con-
stitutional rights and duties of inmates and officials.   
 
1. The Elements of a Better Policy for Trans
 sexual  Inmate Health Care 
 
The first important standard for treating a transsexual inmate’s se-
rious medical need is requiring prison doctors to continue hormone 
treatments that the inmate pursued prior to incarceration.  This re-
quirement is not only to provide GID-specific treatment, but also to 
prevent the severe physical and mental withdrawal that may arise 
from discontinuing treatment.175  De’lonta v. Angelone demonstrated 
the great dangers to an inmate’s physical and mental health caused by 
discontinuing hormone therapy, and, therefore, the necessity of con-
tinuing ongoing treatments.176  Prior to incarceration, and even at a 
previous facility, De’lonta received estrogen, but upon transfer to an-
other prison, the prison doctor immediately discontinued her estrogen 
treatment under a new state DoC policy that prohibited both medical 
and surgical treatment for GID.177  However, this new policy called 
for first tapering off hormone dosage before finally discontinuing 
hormones altogether.178  Cutting off the estrogen so abruptly caused 
both psychological and physical suffering.179  De’lonta began to suffer 
from nausea and depression and developed an intense urge to mutilate 
herself, including attempts at autocastration.180  Consequently, she 
brought an Eighth Amendment claim alleging denial of adequate 
medical treatment for GID.181  The district court decided that her 
claim was merely a disagreement over medical judgment, which is not 
actionable under the Eighth Amendment, and that “De’lonta was re-
ceiving some treatment.”182  The Fourth Circuit disagreed, stating that 
even if GID were not a serious medical need, the self-mutilation re-
sulting from terminating the estrogen treatment certainly was a serious 
medical need requiring treatment.183  It also said that while “some 
treatment” was provided—counseling and antidepressants—and may 
have alleviated the condition, it was not provided for that purpose or 
  
 175 Cox, supra note 11, at 361. 
 176 De’lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003).  
 177 Id. at 632. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id.  
 181 Id.  
 182 Id. at 632-33.   
 183 Id. at 634. 
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reasonably expected to prevent further harm.184  The Court, therefore, 
ordered the prison to provide her “constitutionally adequate treat-
ment.”185  This decision not only demonstrates recognition of GID as 
a serious medical need but also that not treating GID can produce sec-
ondary serious medical needs that can be even more harmful.  More 
importantly, this court recognized the gulf between some care and 
adequate care.  
The second element follows logically from the first: if an inmate 
may continue treatment for a condition he was properly diagnosed 
with prior to incarceration, then inmates who are diagnosed after in-
carceration should not be denied care either.  It also follows from this 
that prison officials should not deny diagnosis requests in order to 
avoid having to provide any treatment that might follow.  In Brooks v. 
Berg, the plaintiff had felt that she had a female gender identity since 
childhood, but only became aware of GID after she was incarcerated, 
and realized that it was the only medical treatment that would allevi-
ate her suffering.186  After repeated unanswered requests up the ad-
ministrative chain of prison authority, Brooks claimed a failure to 
provide “necessary medical treatment for [her] serious medical need,” 
including diagnostic examinations.187  On appeal, the district court 
recognized that Brooks only requested “minimal, though appropriate 
treatments and all necessary examinations/testing,” but that prison 
officials had reduced her requests to just “body altering requests,” 
which were rejected.188  Brooks was simply requesting to see a quali-
fied doctor who could determine what treatment, if any, was neces-
sary.189  The court noted that the prison officials also misinterpreted 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons-drafted policy’s silence regarding 
whether previously undiagnosed inmates could receive treatment as a 
prohibition on providing care to transsexuals diagnosed in prison.190  
Inmates diagnosed with other physical or mental illnesses are not de-
nied treatment “simply because their conditions were not diagnosed 
prior to incarceration.”191  The court concluded that a “blanket denial 
  
 184 Id. at 635. 
 185 Id. at 636.  However, having remanded the case for further proceedings, 
the court declined to “comment on the type of treatment, if any, to which De’lonta is 
entitled.”  Id. 
 186 Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 187 Id. at 304, 306.  In her testimony, Brooks stated that “I was never seen by 
medical staff, which prevented them from determining whether or not such treatment 
was necessary in my case specifically.”  Id. at 306.  
 188 Id. at 305-06.  
 189 Id. at 306. 
 190 Id. at 312.  
 191 Id.  
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of medical treatment” is contrary to the Eighth Amendment.  This 
decision placed an obligation on prison officials to provide inmates 
diagnostic examinations in order to determine whether a serious 
medical need that requires treatment is indicated.192 
The necessary corollary of this rule is that when an inmate is not 
diagnosed as a transsexual suffering from GID or as not needing a 
particular treatment, there is no Eighth Amendment violation for de-
nying that inmate the desired care.193  In Praylor v. Texas Department 
of Criminal Justice, the plaintiff claimed that he was unconstitution-
ally denied treatment for his GID.194  The court rejected his claim be-
cause prison officials demonstrated that Praylor did not qualify for 
medical treatment under the prison’s policy for treating transsexual 
inmates.  The officials also demonstrated that providing hormones 
would interfere with prison security and that psychotherapy treatment 
was available to transsexual inmates.195  Judging from the policy, 
which required psychological screening of transsexual inmates and 
hormone therapy only for medical necessity196—diagnostic tools used 
by the WPATH Standards of Care197—an experienced official was 
involved in the determination.   
Brooks also speaks to the final element of a better universal pol-
icy: ensuring that the appropriate prison officials make the decisions 
concerning transsexual inmate health care.  In requiring diagnostic 
examinations, the court stated further that a medical professional, and 
not a lay administrator, must determine any treatment for the inmate 
patient.198  Furthermore, treatment decisions, whether to provide or 
deny care, must be based on the “sound medical judgment” of the 
medical professional.199  The court noted that even Brooks, who be-
lieved that a wide variety of surgeries may be appropriate, recognized 
what the prison officials did not, that only a “qualified medical profes-
sional” could determine what treatment was “minimal though appro-
priate.”200  This standard arose from a decision the previous year in 
Kosilek v. Maloney, where the court stated that “adequate care” meant 
treatment by “qualified personnel” in accordance with “prudent pro-
  
 192 Id.  
 193 Praylor v. Texas Dep’t Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 
2005).  
 194 Id. at 1208. 
 195 Id. at 1209. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 1, 8. 
 198 Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 199 Id. at 312. 
 200 Id. at 305. 
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fessional standards in the community.”201  However, the court recog-
nized that other prudent and practical concerns, such as the need to 
maintain security and safety, might override an inmate’s constitutional 
right to GID treatment.202  But if an official decides that his duty to 
ensure an inmate’s safety must override the duty to provide adequate 
care to that inmate, only a court can decide whether there is an Eighth 
Amendment violation.203  While this standard does not grant an abso-
lute right to adequate care, it still protects inmate patients from deci-
sions based on inappropriate considerations or troublesome interpreta-
tions of official policy or medical practice.204  
2.  Cost is Not Grounds for Denying Treatment  
 
When legal arguments are exhausted, some prison officials try de-
fending their decisions to deny medical treatment on practical 
grounds.  Judge Posner in Maggert v. Hanks asserted that prisons had 
no duty to provide treatments for GID in part because they are “pro-
tracted and expensive” procedures, and the cost of full transformation 
can reach $100,000 for a male-to-female procedure.205  In support of 
some judicial determinations that attending physicians are solely re-
sponsible for health-care decisions, medical advocates are quick to 
point out that doctors are trained to not consider cost or pass judgment 
as to whether the patient deserves the treatment.206  Leaving medical 
decisions to those concerned with the budget only ensures that need-
less suffering will ensue.207  This would also violate the “sound medi-
cal judgment” standard established in Brooks.208 
Furthermore, prisons readily provide other costly procedures to 
inmates.  In 2005, the DoC estimated that one coronary bypass costs 
$37,000 and one kidney transplant costs $33,000, whereas it estimated 
that complete sex reassignment would cost only $20,000.209  In 2004, 
the DoC paid only $2,300 for hormone therapy for two inmates, but 
  
 201 Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 202 Id. at 162.  
 203 Id.  
 204 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976). 
 205 Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1997).  Judge Posner, 
however, said the decision was not based solely on cost, but rather that, at that time, 
GID was not widely recognized as a sufficient serious medical need.  Id. at 672. 
 206 Chin, supra note 19, at 174.  
 207 See id. 
 208 Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 209 Cox, supra note 11, at 361.  Between 2005 and 2007, five kidney trans-
plants were performed.  Id.  Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 837 (E.D. Wis. 
2010). 
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paid $2.5 million for inmates to take antipsychotic drugs.210  Provid-
ing expensive procedures such as those, but denying substantially less 
expensive and intensive treatments, like hormone therapy, appears to 
be a decision based on considerations other than the patient’s medical 
needs or even cost.  This also clearly violates the Brooks standard. 
Fortunately, at least one federal court has completely foreclosed 
prison officials from taking a particular treatment’s cost into account 
when deciding what care is available to an inmate.211  In Kosilek v. 
Maloney, the plaintiff was a transsexual who suffered from depression 
that led to suicide and autocastration attempts.212  Having been denied 
care by Maloney, Kosilek filed suit against him in his official capacity 
as the DoC commissioner, asking the court for provisions that would 
be made obligatory a year later in Brooks.213  Kosilek simply wanted a 
doctor experienced with GID to diagnose and prescribe adequate 
treatment, and for the prison officials to provide that treatment.214  
Unlike in Brooks and De’lonta v. Angelone, Maloney adopted his own 
policy for GID care that froze care upon incarceration.215  Maloney 
adopted this policy due to a variety of administrative concerns: secu-
rity, public and political criticism, and that GID treatments may be an 
inappropriate use of taxpayer money.216  The court recognized that 
security is a legitimate concern, but declared that it is 
“[im]permissible to deny an inmate adequate medical care because it 
is costly.”217  If Maloney denied Kosilek adequate care for GID based 
on “cost or controversy,” he violated the Eighth Amendment.218  This 
outcome protects transsexual inmate patients from administrative de-
cisions based on inappropriate considerations and compels prison of-
ficials to rely on the sound medical judgment of experienced medical 
professionals for diagnosis and treatment. 
Even if cost was a legitimate concern for prison administrators, 
the care that is currently accessible, and the care that would be acces-
sible under the more liberal standard described below, is not cost pro-
  
 210 Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 837.  Hormone therapy only costs the DoC 
about $300 to $1000 per inmate per year, whereas the antipsychotic drug Quetiapine 
costs between $2,555 and $2,920 per inmate per year.  Id. 
 211 Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D. Mass. 2002).  
 212 Id. at 158, 165.  
 213 Id. at 159; Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 214 Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159.  
 215 Although this policy was similar to the policy established by the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, Maloney developed it after consulting with DoC doctors and attor-
neys, and was not merely employing an already established policy.  Id.   
 216 Id. at 162. 
 217 Id. at 161.  
 218 Id. at 162.  
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hibitive because of four important limiting factors.  First, to receive 
treatment, a prison doctor must diagnose the inmate patient as a trans-
sexual suffering from GID.219  Second, the quantum of diagnosed 
transsexual inmates is miniscule.220  Third, not all transsexual prison-
ers will want treatment or have the same medical needs.221   Fourth, 
despite Judge Posner’s concerns,222 given the safety risks,223 it is un-
reasonable to assume that transsexuals will commit crimes just to re-
ceive medical treatment.224  With enforceable diagnosis guidelines, 
low numbers, variable need, and no incentive to abuse the system, 
even if all transsexual inmates were provided greater care, the total 
costs would not be prohibitive compared to the rest of the health-care 
budget.225   
These medical and cost considerations form a strong foundation 
for a better policy.  These are broad ideals that do not prohibit refine-
ment as greater scientific understanding of transsexualism develops 
and medical treatments improve.  A policy built on this foundation 
will meet an inmate’s specific medical needs and provide proper guid-
ance to prison officials as to when treatment must be provided.  It will 
also conform to both the medical consensus on GID treatment (as 
codified in the Standards of Care226) and balance the inmates’ consti-
tutional rights with the prison officials’ constitutional duties.  Courts, 
therefore, only need to be convinced that such a policy is effective at 
treating GID, and that society values its implementation. 
 
IV. The Eighth Amendment Requires Gender Identity              
 Disorder Treatment 
 
That the Eighth Amendment requires care for prisoners’ basic 
needs is clear.227  While treatment for GID may not seem like a basic 
need, adequate medical treatment for serious medical needs certainly 
  
 219 STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 3. 
 220 Brown & McDuffie, supra note 15, at 281-282. 
 221 Cox, supra note 11, at 360-61. 
 222 Judge Posner stated, “[w]e do not want transsexuals committing crimes 
because it is the only route to obtaining a cure.”  Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 
672 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 223 See infra Part IV.E. 
 224 There are no reported cases of transsexuals committing crime just to re-
ceive treatment to support Posner’s concern. Sultan, supra note 53, at 1207-06. 
 225 Cox, supra note 11, at 360-62.  
 226 See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13. 
 227 See supra Part III.B. 
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is.228  Estelle v. Gamble established that prison officials must provide 
only some care.229  But “some care” might practically mean “no care” 
if that care does not adequately or effectively address the severity of 
the serious medical need.  While there is no constitutional requirement 
that treatment must cure an inmate’s condition or illness, the care pro-
vided must at least mitigate the inmate’s suffering while he or she is 
in the state’s custody.230  The duties imposed on prison officials by 
this requirement for appropriate mitigating care may be interpreted in 
two ways.   
One interpretation says that at least a minimum of adequate care 
is required.  This provides a lower limit for the degree of care officials 
must provide, below which is a denial of care that “constitutes unnec-
essary and wanton infliction of pain.”231  However, it does not estab-
lish an upper limit on the care that inmates may demand.  This inter-
pretation, therefore, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s qualification 
to the deliberate indifference standard that medical judgments not to 
pursue a particular treatment are not grounds for a claim.232   
The second, and perhaps more appropriate, interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment requires only the minimum treatment required to 
effectively treat the condition.  This maintains the lower limit needed 
to protect inmates’ constitutional rights; in fact, it may raise it slightly.  
However, it caps treatment at the point where the serious medical 
problem has been cured or substantially alleviated.  This view is in 
accordance with the tax court’s belief that the treatment should “bear 
a direct or proximate therapeutic relation” to the need.233  This is also 
a flexible policy in line with the Standards of Care that meets the pa-
tient’s specific needs.  If a transsexual inmate requires only psychiat-
ric therapy to alleviate GID, then that is all that the Eighth Amend-
ment requires, and all that prison officials must provide.  However, if 
in another case the inmate cannot be adequately treated with psychiat-
  
 228 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); see also Maggert v. 
Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (“The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to forbid 
prisons to ignore the serious medical, including psychiatric, afflictions of prisoners.”). 
 229 See supra Part III.B.  
 230 Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“‘[P]resently 
medically necessary’ describes treatment ‘without which an inmate could not be 
maintained without significant risk of either further serious deterioration of his/her 
condition or significant reduction of the chance of possible repair after release, or 
without significant pain or discomfort.’”). 
 231 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 
(1976)). 
 232 Id. at 107. 
 233 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 65 (2010) (quoting Havey v. 
Comm’r, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949)). 
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ric therapy, then, upon proper diagnosis, hormones should be pro-
vided.   
The Ninth Circuit used a standard for adequate care regarding 
other aspects of inmate care that reflects many of the same values as 
the second interpretation.234  In Johnson v. Lewis, the plaintiff in-
mates, suing as a class, alleged that their Eighth Amendment right to 
official provision for their basic needs was violated.235  On two occa-
sions following prison unrest, the inmates were kept out in the yard, 
exposed to extreme elements with few provisions for protection, 
waste, hygiene, or nourishment for extended periods of time.236   The 
district court rejected their claim under a standard of care similar to 
that expressed in Estelle v. Gamble.237  Because the prison officials 
had provided some protection from the elements, food, water, medical 
care, and sanitation, they were not liable for violating their Eighth 
Amendment duties because they did not cause sufficient harm.238  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court because the prison 
officials meeting “some needs” at “some times” did not establish that 
sufficient or adequate care was in fact provided.239  While the officials 
were not obligated to provide every possible amenity, they had a duty 
to meet the inmates’ basic needs. 
The Tenth Circuit went a little further, holding that a prison offi-
cial may be liable when he makes efforts “reasonably calculated to 
reduce the risk [of harm]” that fail, if he intentionally refuses reason-
able alternatives and the risk continues.240  Applying this to transsex-
ual inmate patients, if the prison doctor provides psychotherapy, but 
the inmate’s depression or urges for self-mutilation continue, the doc-
tor may be liable under the Eighth Amendment for not providing the 
hormones necessary to alleviate the suffering. 
A narrower interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is most ap-
propriate for advancing transsexual inmates’ health-care interests.  
Although it may eliminate access to surgical sex reassignment, it 
strengthens the right to sex-appropriate hormone therapy.  Using this 
interpretation in conjunction with the case law discussed above,241 a 
better policy for treating inmates with GID can be crafted.  
  
 234 See Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 235 Id. at 729.  
 236 Id. at 729-31. 
 237 See supra Part III.B. 
 238 Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. 
 239 Id. at 732. 
 240 Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 918 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 241 See supra Part III.D. 
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A. Sound Medical Diagnosis without Discrimination   
 
Inmates’ have a constitutional right to the care they need.  The 
first step to protecting that right is ensuring that prison officials can 
provide the proper treatment without judicial intervention.  The sooner 
an inmate’s medical condition is treated, the less pain and suffering 
the inmate will experience.242  Prison officials can only treat a serious 
medical need if it has been diagnosed by an experienced medical pro-
fessional.  An inmate’s right to sound medical diagnosis was recog-
nized in Brooks v. Berg.243  But the court in Brooks left open the ques-
tions of what is sound medical judgment and what is an experienced 
medical professional.   
The WPATH Standards of Care state that, in treating patients with 
GID, an experienced medical professional, at the very least, is one 
who has “basic general clinical competence in diagnosis and treatment 
of mental or emotional disorders.”244  Specialization experience with 
GID requires an advanced degree in clinical behavioral science, spe-
cialized training in assessing DSM-IV sexual disorders—especially 
those disorders that implicate Eighth Amendment concerns, such as 
GID—competence in psychotherapy, and continuing GID treatment 
education.245  If these are the minimum requirements for competently 
diagnosing and treating GID patients, it stands to reason that only a 
medical professional possessing these qualifications has the sound 
medical judgment required to treat a transsexual inmate.  Furthermore, 
given that the Standards of Care are WPATH’s interpretation of the 
international medical community’s consensus on GID treatment,246 
sound medical judgment for treating a transsexual inmate must reflect 
the Standards of Care, though balanced against the legitimate practical 
concerns of the prison environment.  If examined by a qualified medi-
cal professional, a diagnosis is a simple matter and only requires 
meeting the clinical threshold described in the Standards of Care247 
  
 242 None of the courts in the cases discussed supra Part III explicitly recog-
nized that in the time between the plaintiff filing the complaint and the court’s final 
ruling the plaintiff is still suffering from GID symptoms and denied effective care 
unless temporary injunctive relief was granted.  In the case of Kosilek v. Maloney, it 
was ten years before a final ruling was handed down.  221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D. 
Mass. 2002). 
 243 See Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 244 STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 6. 
 245 Id. at 6-7. 
 246 Id. at 1. 
 247 Id. at 2 (stating that “[a] clinical threshold is passed when concerns, uncer-
tainties, and questions about gender identity persist during a person’s development, 
become so intense as to seem to be the most important aspect of a person’s life, or 
prevent the establishment of a relatively unconflicted gender identity”). 
262 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 227]  
and comparing the patient’s indicated symptoms to the DSM-IV 
guidelines.248 
Another open question is which prisoners are entitled to a diagno-
sis.  All inmates who feel that they have a gender-sex incongruity are 
entitled to be examined by a medical professional and, if indicated, 
diagnosed as a transsexual.  There are two key reasons for requiring 
universal access to sound medical diagnosis.  First, as stated above, an 
undiagnosed serious medical need cannot be treated.  Second, many 
transsexuals only “come to terms with their true gender identity dur-
ing mid-life.”249  In some cases, prison might be the first time these 
inmates have access to real health care and the opportunity to have 
any medical problems diagnosed and treated.  In any case, though, it 
would be wrong for prison officials to deny an inmate the opportunity 
to be examined in order to avoid treating a serious medical need.  It is 
important to note, however, that a medical examination will not nec-
essarily yield a GID diagnosis.  If upon examination the inmate pa-
tient is diagnosed as suffering from GID, then the medical profes-
sional has an array of effective, though limited, treatment options at 
his disposal to which the patient may then be constitutionally entitled.   
B. Psychotherapy is Some Care but Not Necessarily 
 Adequate Care 
 
Psychotherapy is the first and least intensive treatment for GID, as 
prescribed by the WPATH Standards of Care.250  The Standards of 
Care state that not all transsexuals require every step of the treatment 
sequence to become comfortable with their incongruity, and that not 
all will require psychotherapy to move on to hormone treatment.251  
The real therapeutic value of psychotherapy is that it aids the “discov-
ery and maturational processes that enable self-comfort.”252  However, 
despite the valuable role it plays in providing comfort, psychotherapy 
is not a cure for GID.253  This is evident from the fact that many trans-
sexuals still pursue the more intensive hormonal and surgical thera-
pies despite successful psychotherapy.  It has also been demonstrated 
in many of the cases discussed above. For example: O’Donnabhain 
only found relief after starting hormone treatment;254 De’lonta experi-
  
 248 See supra notes 35-36, and accompanying text. 
 249 Howell, supra note 24, at 180. 
 250 See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 3, 11. 
 251 See id. 
 252 Id. at 11.  
 253 See id. at 12. 
 254 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 39 (2010). 
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enced severe psychological deterioration after being denied hormones 
despite the fact that psychotherapy was available;255 but Praylor had to 
be satisfied with only psychotherapy because he was not diagnosed as 
needing anything more.256  Despite rejecting arguments that prisons 
have a duty to provide extensive care for GID, even Judge Posner 
pointed out that while “less drastic treatments are available for this 
condition” only the more intensive treatments have been successful in 
treating it.257   
Given that psychotherapy is not very intensive, relatively easy to 
provide, and unlikely to create security concerns,258 prison officials 
routinely provide it to transsexual inmates. 
C. Prescribing Hormones Following Sound Medical 
  Diagnosis  
 
According to the WPATH protocols, following psychotherapy, 
gender-specific hormones are the next level of treatment.259  The 
Standards of Care place great emphasis on hormone therapy due to its 
proven medical effectiveness and widespread patient satisfaction with 
the results.  Hormones are generally necessary for “successful living 
in the new gender” and for reducing “psychiatric co-morbidity.”260  
Hormones alleviate GID symptoms by altering physical characteris-
tics to align with the desired gender.261  In many, if not most, cases, 
hormones are sufficient to relieve GID symptoms, thereby removing 
the need to pursue the more intensive and permanent surgeries.262 
Being incarcerated is an abrupt life change, and it presents many 
health risks to transsexuals.  The Standards of Care insist that hor-
mone treatment should not be discontinued.263  Discontinuing hor-
mone therapy can cause emotional instability, “regression of hormon-
  
 255 See De’lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 632-35 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 256 Praylor v. Texas Dep’t Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 
2005). 
 257 Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 258 See Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161 (D. Mass. 2002) (citing 
security concerns as a legitimate reason to deny hormones and reassignment surgery). 
 259 STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 13. 
 260 Id.  Mario Maj, ‘Psychiatric Comorbidity’: An Artefact of Current Diag-
nostic Systems?,186 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 182, 182 (2005) (“[Comorbidity] has re-
cently become very fashionable in psychiatry to indicate not only those cases in 
which a patient receives both a psychiatric and a general medical diagnosis (e.g. ma-
jor depression and hypertension), but also those cases in which a patient receives two 
or more psychiatric diagnoses (e.g. major depression and panic disorder.”). 
 261 STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 13. 
 262 Id. at 14. 
 263 Id. 
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ally-induced” physical changes, and severe psychological problems, 
including “depression, anxiety and suicidality.”264  Rapid discontinua-
tion may cause even more severe health risks.265  The cases discussed 
above in Parts III.B and III.D have also clearly demonstrated the trou-
bles transsexual inmates experience when they are denied hormone 
therapy.266  Fortunately, many courts have recognized the value that 
hormone therapy has for transsexuals suffering from GID.    
Given the demonstrable effectiveness of hormone therapy and the 
risks of denying it, the Eighth Amendment must provide that prison 
medical personnel prescribe sex-appropriate hormones to all diag-
nosed transsexual inmate patients.  This does not mean that all trans-
sexuals are automatically entitled to hormones.  The Eighth Amend-
ment only requires effective treatment for a serious medical need.  
The inmate must actually have a serious medical need, diagnosed by a 
medical professional.  Not providing treatment to one who has not 
been diagnosed as having a serious and treatable medical condition 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment.267 
All inmates diagnosed with GID should have access to the neces-
sary treatments.  Prisons are currently only required to provide hor-
mones to those who medically qualify, but it is inconsistent with the 
principles embodied in the Eighth Amendment to universally deny 
these treatments to all transsexuals.268   
D. Sex Reassignment Surgery is Not Required 
 
Currently, no prison facilities in the United States have policies 
that provide sex reassignment surgeries (SRS), either genital or non-
genital, to transsexual inmates.269  Based on a standard that only re-
quires minimum effective treatments and not fully curing long-term 
conditions, SRS is beyond the medical needs of most transsexual in-
mates.270   
  
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. 
 266 See Howell, supra note 24, at 154 (“[A]ccess to cross gender hormone 
therapy . . . improves people’s quality of life.”); see also De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 
F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 267 See Praylor v. Texas Dep’t Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1208-09 (5th 
Cir. 2005). 
 268 Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 269 Howell, supra note 24, at 155. 
 270 Chin, supra note 19, at 175 (arguing that Gender Reassignment Surgery is 
above a basic medical necessity); see Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 611 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (“‘[P]resently medically necessary’ describes treatment ‘without which an 
inmate could not be maintained without significant risk of either further serious dete-
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The minimum effective requirement limits prisoners’ claims be-
cause the treatment provided should not exceed that which is neces-
sary to alleviate or cure the condition while the inmate is incarcerated.  
This comports with the Estelle qualification that a medical decision 
not to pursue a treatment option does not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment 271 and Posner’s opinion that prisoners should not receive care 
that is generally unavailable to nonincarcerated persons.272 SRS is not 
medically available or necessary for many transsexuals,273 and, due to 
prejudicial difficulties in the workplace, many cannot even afford it.274  
Surgery is not necessary for all GID cases, and the WPATH Stan-
dards of Care recommend reserving it for only the most serious 
cases.275  Most transsexuals are able to successfully complete their 
transitions without it.276  Hormones alleviate most symptoms and ease 
suffering without causing serious complications, except for when 
those hormones are discontinued.  Surgery creates a much greater risk 
of harm.  Although desperate transsexuals may believe that surgery is 
a “life saving measure[],”277 the Eighth Amendment does not require 
it. 
There are also significant issues beyond medical necessity.  The 
effectiveness of surgical procedures for GID patients is still under 
study.278  Furthermore, the many postoperative complications that 
may follow give rise to both physical and legal problems.279  While a 
well-performed surgery may itself entail little risk for the patient,280 
the potential future health complications can be severe.281  Surgery 
does not necessarily produce fully functioning sex organs, and some 
genital constructions may detach282 or collapse,283 requiring extensive 
  
rioration of his/her condition or significant reduction of the chance of possible repair 
after release, or without significant pain or discomfort.’”). 
 271 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). 
 272 Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A prison is not 
required by the Eighth Amendment to give a prisoner medical care that is as good as 
he would receive if her were a free person, let alone an affluent one.”). 
 273 See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13. 
 274 NTDS, supra note 59, at 2. 
 275 See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 18-19.  One transsexual stated 
that surgery was not necessary for finding comfort with his identity saying: “I don’t 
really want to mess with my body like that. . . . I’m a different kind of a thing, a new 
thing, and that’s okay.”  Cox, supra note 11, at 364. 
 276 Tobin, supra note 11, at 400. 
 277 Cox, supra note 11, at 365. 
 278 Id. at 364. 
 279 Id. at 364-65. 
 280 Tobin, supra note 11, at 399. 
 281 Id. at 400. 
 282 Cox, supra note 11, at 365. 
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reconstruction to repair the damage.284  To require SRS puts officials 
in a constitutional bind.  If the Eighth Amendment prohibits conduct 
that may cause a prisoner to suffer, it should not require a drastic 
treatment that may lead to harm or illness for an inmate.    
A study published in February 2011 that followed postoperative 
transsexuals in Sweden revealed many problems plaguing transsexu-
als who completed SRS.285  The study stated that prior data concern-
ing postoperative transsexuals was inconsistent and inconclusive, with 
some reporting improvement both psychiatrically and psychologically 
following hormone therapy and SRS and others reporting “regrets, 
psychiatric morbidity, and suicide attempts.”286  Following 324 Swed-
ish transsexuals who had SRS over a thirty-year period, the study re-
ported that these individuals had three times the risk of death,287 
higher rates of suicide, cardiovascular disease, malignancies,288 in-
creased risk of hospitalization for non-GID psychiatric disorders, and 
greater rates of conviction than the general population.289   The re-
port’s authors suggested that postoperative transsexuals have greater 
health problems because many avoid the health-care system out of 
fear of discrimination and that they generally had “more psychiatric 
ill-health than the general population prior to the sex reassignment,” 
which may continue even after successful transformation.290 
Refusing SRS to inmates is inconsistent with the O’Donnabhain 
decision.  However, there is a difference between IRC § 213 and the 
Eighth Amendment.  Section 213 allows tax deductions for all effec-
tive treatments for GID.  There is no cap to § 213’s allowances, as 
long as the expenses relate to medically effective procedures.  The 
Eighth Amendment, however, does not require therapies that exceed 
what is necessary to treat the inmate’s condition while he or she is 
incarcerated.     
An exception may be permissible for inmates sentenced to life 
without parole.  The WPATH Standards of Care require a successful 
  
 283 Tobin, supra note 11, at 399 (quoting Lynn Conway, Postoperative Care 
Following Vaginoplasty (SRS), ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LAB, UNIV. OF MICHIGAN 
ELECTRICAL ENG’G & COMPUTER SCI. DEP’T, 
http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/BM/SRS-BM.html (last updated Aug. 1, 
2009)). 
 284 Id. at 400 (quoting Conway, supra note 282)). 
 285 See Cecilia Dhejne et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons 
Undergoing Sex Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden, 6 PLOS ONE 1 (Feb. 
22, 2011), http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0016885. 
 286 Id. at 2.  
 287 Id. at 4.  
 288 Id. at 5. 
 289 Id. at 6. 
 290 Id.  
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twelve-month minimum life experience in order to qualify for SRS.291  
This is a test for how well the transsexual individual functions in soci-
ety as the intended sex.  For life prisoners, the prison is their life expe-
rience and is the community in which they will live and die.292  Given 
how rare these cases are, there may be little harm in extending the 
degree of care.  Therefore the standard that a long-term condition need 
not be cured in prison may be relaxed because the inmate may never 
find medical relief outside. 
E. Appropriate Housing for Transsexual Inmates 
 
If sex-altering treatment is provided, transsexual inmates will re-
quire special housing accommodations to protect them from inmate 
predation.  Although Judge Posner rejected pleas for medical relief, he 
recognized the physical dangers associated with being a transsexual 
and affirmed the right to protection “from harassment by prisoners 
who wish to use [transsexual inmates] as a sexual plaything.”293 
Unfortunately, housing for transsexual inmates presents a confus-
ing paradox because all available options present constitutional prob-
lems.294  Placing transsexual inmates in the general population creates 
a serious risk of violent assault.  But placing those inmates in adminis-
trative segregation for protection may punish them beyond the sen-
tences for their crimes.295   
As one commentator stated, “[p]rison rapes do not occur in a vac-
uum.”296  Prison society operates according to a “code” that divides 
the strong from the weak and the dominant from the subjugated along 
lines of “fighting ability and manliness.”297  Weaker or more stereo-
typically feminine inmates are at the bottom of prison society and at 
the highest risk of victimization.298  The threat of sexual violence in 
prisons is so well recognized that Congress passed legislation to com-
bat it: the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003.299  The Act’s findings 
estimated that, in the twenty years prior to enactment, over one mil-
  
 291 STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 20. 
 292 See Cox, supra note 11, at 350. 
 293 Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 294 Tedeschi, supra note 145, at 44; see Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 
408, 417 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 295 “When convicted offenders are sentenced to time in prison, living in 
prison for that time under existing conditions is the punishment.” Dolovitch, supra 
note 10, at 907.   
 296 Peek, supra note 73, at 1226 (quoting Terry A. Kupers, PRISON 
MASCULINITIES 113 (2001)). 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. at 1226-27. 
 299 Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601 (2008). 
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lion inmates had suffered some form of sexual abuse, and that inmates 
with mental conditions or illness were especially susceptible to at-
tack.300  Transsexuals are at substantially greater risk of violent and 
sexual assault in prison due to their femininity or gender nonconform-
ing behavior or appearance.  A survey of California prisons revealed 
that 59 percent of transgender inmates reported sexual assault, com-
pared to just 4 percent of the general population.301  A national survey, 
reported that 16 percent were physically assaulted and 15 percent 
sexually assaulted.302   
Administrative segregation, as the name implies, is commonly 
used for punishing misbehaving inmates or isolating the most danger-
ous convicts.303  Placing transsexual inmates in administrative segre-
gation because of their transsexual status and not for any misconduct, 
even if it is for their protection, effectively punishes them for being 
transsexual.304  It is punishment because it denies them the privi-
leges—such as, socializing with others and outdoors activities—that 
the general population enjoys.305  It begs the question of why the per-
petrators of violent assaults are not segregated instead, in order to 
protect the vulnerable inmates.  If the violent inmates are segregated 
from society because they could not properly function in it, they 
should also be removed from the general prison population for violat-
ing its integrity and security as well.  The most likely answer is that it 
is easier this way because there are far fewer victims than predators.306  
As with medical care,307 an official’s constitutional duty to provide 
  
 300 Id. §§ 15601 (2)-(3). 
 301 Christine Nader & Trisha J. Pasdach, Correctional Facilities, 11 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 77, 94 (2010). 
 302 Healthy People 2020 Transgender Health Fact Sheet, NAT’L LGBT 
TOBACCO CONTROL NETWORK 4 (Nov. 2010), 
http://www.lgbttobacco.org/files/TransgenderHealthFact.pdf. 
 303 Meriwhether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Whether a 
prisoner may be subjected to the restrictive and necessarily harsh conditions of ad-
ministrative segregation, not resulting from his own misconduct, for such a long 
period of time is a very difficult question.”). 
 304 Howell, supra note 24, at 144, 192 (arguing that such actions constitute a 
punishment in excess of the one the state handed down for the crime); Meriwhether, 
821 F.2d at 416 (“Plaintiff complains that by being confined in administrative segre-
gation, she is denied adequate recreation, living space, educational and occupational 
rehabilitation opportunities, and associational rights for nonpunitive reasons.”). 
 305 Peek, supra note 73, at 1239. 
 306 See Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 417 (“Prison officials must be accorded wide-
ranging deference in matters of internal order and security . . . .”).  
 307 See supra Part III.D.1. 
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security to all inmates may override a single inmate’s constitutional 
rights.308  
A common sentiment may be that if the inmate did not want to 
risk the dangers of prison, then he should not have committed the 
crime.  However, the dangers of physical and sexual assault are not an 
inherent condition of institutional incarceration and are not part of the 
state’s sentence for the crime.  The sentenced time to be served is the 
extent of the state’s lawful punishment.309  The Eighth Amendment’s 
role is to ensure that states and the deputies charged with carrying out 
the sentences uphold that ideal.  If these risks were factored in, then 
the sentences ought to be shortened.   
Some suggest that a way to avoid these risks is to house transsex-
ual inmates according to their subjective gender rather than their ob-
jective sex.310  However, this does not entirely eliminate the risk,311 
and it raises serious questions about privacy rights for the objectively 
female inmates.312  No court has decisively ruled on this point.313  But 
it is not entirely unheard of for a preoperative transsexual to be housed 
according to subjective gender identity rather than physical sex.  In 
2009, Jasmine Anderson, an objectively-male transsexual, was im-
prisoned for selling drugs.  Though initially housed in a male facility, 
she was eventually transferred to a women’s facility in northern 
Ohio.314  This is certainly the exception rather than the rule, but it is 
encouraging that prison officials are making exceptions for inmates 
who need special accommodation. 
A more progressive but controversial plan would be to have trans-
sexual-only facilities.  Though it may sound impractical, Italy has 
established a prison specifically to house transgender inmates.315  It 
was not a huge undertaking, housing only thirty transgender inmates 
in a former prison for women, and Italy’s most famous transsexual, a 
  
 308 White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he State has a 
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 310 Howell, supra note 24, at 147. 
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former member of parliament, believed that the prison allowed these 
inmates to “serve their time without being persecuted for their sexual 
identity.”316  Given the small number of transsexual prisoners, a simi-
lar program in the United States would be less financially burdensome 
than politically untenable.  
Physical security is not only an interest for transsexual inmates, 
but a constitutional right.317  It is also in society’s best interest to keep 
prisoners safe from violence at the hands of fellow inmates because 
“brutalized inmates [are] more likely to commit crimes when released 
. . . [because they] suffer severe physical and psychological effects 
that hinder their ability to integrate into the community and maintain 
stable employment . . . .”318  With difficulty finding stable employ-
ment,319 inmates who were brutalized in prison are more likely to be-
come homeless or require government assistance and have higher 
rates of recidivism.320 
Providing health care along with safe housing may promote reha-
bilitation more than anything else for transsexual inmates.321  Given 
that many transsexual inmates were driven to crime to survive or pay 
for some form of treatment, providing adequate treatment and protect-
ing them from victimization may help them successfully reintegrate 
into society as the desired gender and thereby prevent recidivism.322   
If the O’Donnabhain standard influences the way courts treat 
transsexual inmates, then new housing protocols must be established 
to protect inmates.  The Eighth Amendment prohibits conduct by 
prison officials that puts inmates at risk of harm.  If seeking medical 
treatment would put the inmate at risk of some other physical harm, 
then the Eighth Amendment in providing for that medical treatment 
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must also compel other protections to prevent any harm from other 
inmates reacting to that treatment.  If this were not true, then the 
Eighth Amendment’s protections would become paradoxical or im-
possible for prison officials to uphold in practice, and would unfairly 
force inmates to decide which right is most important to them.  Some 
compromise must be found that can adequately serve both interests 
because transsexual inmates should not be forced to choose between 
treating their serious medical need and suffering at the hands of preda-
tors.  
CONCLUSION 
Transsexualism has been recognized as a serious medical need.323  
Accordingly, under Estelle v. Gamble, prisoners diagnosed as trans-
sexual have a constitutionally protected right to adequate medical care 
under the Eighth Amendment.324  The American public has recog-
nized that transgender and transsexual individuals are a social and 
sexual minority deserving increased legal and institutional protections.  
It is only right, constitutionally and morally, that these greater protec-
tions granted by federal and state governments extend to transsexuals 
in the carceral care of those governments.  After all, inmates are con-
stitutionally entitled to state-provided health care, whereas the popula-
tion at large is not.   
For many years, proposals regarding adequate care for transsexu-
als have been debated by advocacy groups and commentators.  While 
these are valuable efforts, courts are not required to acquiesce to every 
demand to change the law.325  Hopefully, the opinion of a forward-
thinking administrative tax court, when coupled with strong demon-
strations of evolving social expectations, will carry more weight in the 
analysis of what treatment transsexual inmates are entitled to.  The 
O’Donnabhain court decided that if there is a legitimate and serious 
medical need, and the treatment bears “a direct or proximate therapeu-
tic relation” to that need, a transgender individual is entitled to the tax 
benefit for medical expenses.326  Translated to the Eighth Amendment 
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412 (1949)). 
272 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 227]  
context, it should mean that the level of care that properly diagnosed 
transsexual inmates receive is adequate for the severity of their GID.  
Inmates who feel that they have an incongruity between their gender 
and sex are, at the very least, entitled to medical examination to de-
termine whether they are in fact transsexual.  If sound medical judg-
ment indicates a transsexual diagnosis, then care is required.  If the 
medical judgment determines that the inmate only requires psycho-
therapy, then that is all that the inmate is entitled to.  But, if another 
inmate requires more, the care provided should not be limited by non-
medical concerns or the fact that another inmate required less inten-
sive care.  Consequently, if a prison official relies on sound medical 
judgment, then the complaining inmate does not have an Eighth 
Amendment claim.327  If sex-altering treatment is provided, appropri-
ate steps must be taken to protect the inmate from predation.   
Our social and cultural predilection for a gender binary system 
and shunning of criminals should not lead us to deny transsexual in-
mates proper treatment.  Indeed they are criminals, but the sentence 
the justice system imposed was the extent of our moral condemnation 
for their actions.  Denying them adequate treatment for GID is punish-
ing them not for their crimes, but for their medical condition.  Offend-
ing cultural norms is not offending society’s laws.  Punishing the for-
mer certainly constitutes a “cruel and unusual punishment.”328  More 
importantly, if we can rehabilitate transgender inmates in both the 
medical and social sense, perhaps they will not return to prison. 
The relationship between society’s evolving standards of decency 
and the Eighth Amendment provisions is always subject to change.  
Change has occurred.  It is time that constitutional interpretations mir-
ror that evolution.  The hope now is to find a court willing to take the 
leap. 
 
  
 327 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (1976). 
 328 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
